Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards: a conceptual approach by Th. Plattner
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 5, 357–366, 2005
SRef-ID: 1684-9981/nhess/2005-5-357
European Geosciences Union
© 2005 Author(s). This work is licensed
under a Creative Commons License.
Natural Hazards
and Earth
System Sciences
Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards: a conceptual
approach
Th. Plattner
Chair of Land Use Engineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Received: 22 September 2004 – Revised: 10 February 2005 – Accepted: 15 March 2005 – Published: 18 April 2005
Part of Special Issue “Multidisciplinary approaches in natural hazard and risk assessment”
Abstract. In recent years, the dealing with natural hazards
in Switzerland has shifted away from being hazard-oriented
towards a risk-based approach. Decreasing societal accep-
tance of risk, accompanied by increasing marginal costs of
protective measures and decreasing ﬁnancial resources cause
an optimization problem. Therefore, the new focus lies on
the mitigation of the hazard’s risk in accordance with eco-
nomical, ecological and social considerations.
This modern proceeding requires an approach in which
not only technological, engineering or scientiﬁc aspects of
the deﬁnition of the hazard or the computation of the risk are
considered, but also the public concerns about the acceptance
of these risks. These aspects of a modern risk approach en-
able a comprehensive assessment of the (risk) situation and,
thus, sound risk management decisions.
In Switzerland, however, the competent authorities suffer
from a lack of decision criteria, as they don’t know what risk
level the public is willing to accept. Consequently, there ex-
ists a need for the authorities to know what the society thinks
about risks. A formalized model that allows at least a crude
simulation of the public risk evaluation could therefore be a
useful tool to support effective and efﬁcient risk mitigation
measures.
This paper presents a conceptual approach of such an eval-
uation model using perception affecting factors PAF, evalu-
ation criteria EC and several factors without any immediate
relation to the risk itself, but to the evaluating person. Fi-
nally, the decision about the acceptance Acc of a certain risk
i is made by a comparison of the perceived risk Ri,perc with
the acceptable risk Ri,acc.
Correspondence to: T. Plattner
(thomas.plattner@env.ethz.ch)
1 Introduction: Dealing with natural hazards in
Switzerland
Due to economical (increasing marginal costs of protective
measures) and environmental reasons (negative ecological
impacts of the protective measures) as well as societal con-
cerns about hazardous events, dealing with natural hazards
in Switzerland has recently shifted away from being hazard-
oriented towards a more risk-based approach. The protection
against hazardous events is no longer the primary guideline
for risk management, the new focus lies on the mitigation
of the hazard risk in accordance with economical, ecological
and social considerations. This newly introduced “culture of
risk” is mainly characterized by PLANAT (the Swiss Natu-
ral Hazard Advisory Committee under the authority of the
swiss government) and their paradigm: “From the avoidance
of hazards towards a culture of risk” (PLANAT, 2005).
2 State of the art: A risk-based approach or a new cul-
ture of risk
The modern swiss proceeding requires a comprehensive ap-
proach of dealing with hazard risks. Not only technological,
engineering or scientiﬁc aspects of the deﬁnition of the haz-
ard or the computation of the risk have to be considered, but
also the public concerns about the acceptable level of these
risks. Together, both aspects of a modern risk approach en-
able a comprehensive assessment of the (risk) situation and,
thus, a sound decision about the necessary risk management
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Fig. 1. The three cornerstones in a modern risk-oriented approach
deﬁning the “risk triangle”: risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk
management.
2.1 The risk triangle
It makes sense to base the swiss risk-based approach on the
components risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk manage-
ment as mentioned by Hollenstein (1997). These compo-
nents are interrelated and inﬂuence each other what can be
illustrated using the picture of ’risk triangle’ (see Fig. 1).
Risk analysis is the process of quantiﬁcation of the prob-
abilities and expected consequences for identiﬁed risks and
answers the question “What can happen?” (SRA, 2005). The
resulting risk is often called the effective or objective risk
Robj and provides information about the extent and fre-
quency of the expected damage of an event. The simplest
deﬁnition of Robj is the product of frequency (or probability)
of event occurrence F times the extent E of the associated
consequence, i.e.
Robj = F · E (1)
Risk evaluation is a socio-political and moral-ethical pro-
cess in which judgements are made about the signiﬁcance
and acceptability of risks (SRA, 2005). It produces the in-
formation that is need to determine the acceptable level of
residual risk Racc. Therefore, it answers the question: “What
may happen?”.
Based on possible initial states comparing the results of
risk analysis and risk evaluation (see Fig. 1 , risk manage-
ment aims at reducing unacceptably high risks and prevent-
ing other risks from becoming so by maintaining a safe state.
For this purpose, it combines Robj and Racc in a political
process and implements measures based on economic and
technological principles (Heinimann, 2002).
2.2 Problems of a risk-based approach
Despite the large potential of a risk-based approach for a
sound and comprehensive dealing with natural hazards, there
are problems that have to be addressed. Risk managers, who
have to decide what level of risk is acceptable are mostly
technological experts. But, very often they have to make
judgements about the way the “lay” public perceives and
evaluates the risks to account for societal concerns. As this
information is usually not available, risk evaluation is often
a knowledge gap in the risk management process.
A model that is able to simulate the public risk evaluation
could be a helpful tool for the risk managers. Therefore, one
of the aims of the proposed project carried out by the Chair of
Land Use Engineering (LUE) of the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Z¨ urich (ETH Z¨ urich) is, primarily, the de-
velopment of a conceptual framework of such a model and,
secondarily, the testing and validation of these framework us-
ing case studies. Within this paper, however, the main focus
lies on the conceptual framework.
Developing such an evaluation model, means addressing
problems that can be summarized in the question: “What
level of risk is acceptable (Racc) and how can it be calcu-
lated in a model?”. Although it is well documented what
factors affect the perception of risks, it is still not absolutely
clear which of these factors are relevant for the evaluation
of natural hazards. Most of the perception research within
the last thirty years was made in the ﬁeld of technological
hazards. The research is mainly based on the initial work
of Farmer (1967) and Starr (1969) and was then improved
by e.g. Slovic (e.g. Slovic et al., 1986; Slovic, 1987), Renn
(e.g. Renn, 1998, 2001; Renn and Klinke, 2002) and others
(e.g. Kasperson et al., 1988; Zwick et al., 2002). Never-
theless, during the last years, several research studies were
also conducted in the ﬁeld of natural hazard risk perception
(e.g. Litai et al., 1983; Rogers, 1984; Fell, 1994; McDaniels
et al., 1995, 1996; Finlay and Fell, 1997; DeChano and But-
ler, 2001; Plapp, 2004; Siegrist et al., 2004).
Furthermore, there exist several attempts to integrate risk
perception ﬁndings in engineering approaches of risk evalu-
ation. So far, in Switzerland such integrative work was es-
sentially done in the ﬁeld of technological hazards on be-
half of companies or federal agencies (e.g. Schneider, 1985;
Bohnenblust and Troxler, 1987). In recent years, also pol-
icy guidelines and regulatory applications of swiss federal
agencies integrating these approaches were developed (e.g.
BUWAL, 1999; EDI, 1989).
2.3 Current approaches of risk evaluation in switzerland
There is a small number of approaches to deﬁne an accept-
able level or risk Racc applied in Switzerland. On the level
of the individual risks are these the approaches of the abso-
lute Threshold Values of risk (Risiko-Grenzwerte) and the
Marginal Costs (Grenzkosten) that the society is willing to
pay to prevent damage, e.g. one casualty (e.g. Merz et al.,
1995; Bohnenblust and Slovic, 1998; BABS, 2005).Th. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards 359
The evaluation of the collective risk and the deﬁnition of
an acceptable level is sometimes done using the Boundary
Line approach (e.g. Farmer, 1967; EDI, 1989). Due to its
comprehensibility, it is mainly applied in regulatory appli-
cations. However, more important is the approach of the
Aversion Term (e.g. Bohnenblust, 1985; Schneider, 1985;
Bohnenblust and Troxler, 1987). This approach is used fre-
quently in the ﬁeld of natural hazards (e.g. BUWAL, 1999;
BABS, 2005), although it was mainly developed in the ﬁeld
of technological hazards (e.g. Litai et al., 1983; Bohnenblust,
1985; Schneider, 1985).
Both formal procedures of collective risk evaluation are
based on the same theoretical assumption: the difference be-
tween the effective risk Robj and the acceptable risk level
Racc (Boundary Line) or the perceived risk Rperc (Aversion
Term) is caused by the extent E of the direct damage of an
event. The extent E of the direct damage works as the basis
for the risk aversion α, according to
α = f(E) = α(E) (2)
Thus, according to these two approaches, risk aversion α
is the driving criteria of risk evaluation and is a surrogate for
the public concerns about the (large) extent of event damage
and the incalculable indirect costs following such an event.
The indirect costs contain a number of aspects, e.g. the costs
of recovery, costs of medical care and the costs of destroyed
infrastructure (e.g. Schneider, 1985; Bohnenblust and Trox-
ler, 1987; Merz et al., 1995; Fuster, 2004) that have to be
deﬁned seperately for every event.
2.3.1 Boundary line
The two procedures differ in the way of including risk aver-
sion α. Within the approach of the Boundary Line constant
risk Rconst is represented on a double-logarithmic chart, plot-
ting the frequency F and the extent of damage E of events,
by a line with the gradient g(B)
g(B) =
1(log(F))
1(log(E))
= −1 (3)
and risk aversion can, therefore, be accounted for by chang-
ing the slope of the boundary line such that
g(B) ∗ α = g∗(B) =
1(log(F∗))
1(log(E))
< −1 (4)
i.e., if the extent of damage doubles, the acceptable fre-
quency of an event is no longer half as high, but less than
half. In Switzerland, this approach is used e.g. in the Swiss
Ordinance on Technological Hazards (EDI, 1989). However,
a problem of this approach is that it is often not obvious if
and to what extent risk aversion has been integrated.
2.3.2 Aversion term
The aversion term approach integrates the risk aversion in the
representation of the actual risk, either using a factor α(E)
RAC = F · E · α(E) (5)
or an exponent
RAC = F · Eα (6)
The author calls the outcome of this approach “aversion-
corrected” risk RAC due to the fact that only the extent of
damage is considered using the aversion α. In current prac-
tice, however, the resulting risk is often called “perceived
risk” Rperc, although all the rest of the factors (e.g. men-
tioned in the proposed literature in Sect. 2.2) affecting the
perception and the evaluation of risk are disregarded.
This approach is often combined with the marginal costs
approach. The aversion-corrected RAC (or even perceived
risk Rperc) is mostly multiplied with the marginal costs of a
damage indicator (i.e. the costs that the society is willing to
pay to prevent that damage). The resulting value is called the
monetarised, aversion-corrected (or even “perceived”) col-
lective risk and enables the comparison of different risks and,
thus, the deﬁnition of a acceptable risk level (e.g. Merz et al.,
1995; BABS, 2005)
Both in the case of the Boundary Line and the Aversion
Term, the relations
α(E) > 1 and dα/dE > 0 (7)
hold, i.e. risks with a greater extent of damage are artiﬁcially
and progressively increased.
3 Principles of a conceptual approach of natural hazard
risk evaluation
The current risk evaluation approaches provide a wealth of
knowledge for the development of a conceptual risk evalu-
ation approach regarding natural hazards. But it has to be
assumed that there are differences between the characteris-
tics of technological and natural hazard risks that must be
taken into account in an evaluation approach. Therefore, the
proposed concept is based on the following elements:
– a mathematical formalization of the theoretical model
background,
– a sound representation of the knowledge about risk per-
ception and evaluation of natural hazard risks, and
– the appropriate role and representation of the evaluating
person
3.1 The theoretical background of the conceptual approach
Using the proposed conceptual approach, three different
types of risk are relevant (see Fig. 2). The personal estima-
tion of the effective risk robj is the point of origin for the risk
perception. But as stated in Sect. 2.2, there are several factors
inﬂuencing the perception that are not included in the ﬁgure
of the objective risk.
These factors are key elements for the calculation of the
perceived risk rperc that either can be smaller or larger than360 Th. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards
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Fig.2. Thethreedifferenttypesofriskusedintheproposedconcep-
tual approach and the differences dE1 and dE2 which are caused by
the effects of the Perception Affecting Factors PAF and Evaluation
Criteria EC.
the ojective risk robj. In Fig. 2 it is assumed that the per-
ceived risk is larger than the effective risk, depending on the
occurrence of the relevant perception affecting factors. The
effective (or objective risk) and the perceived risk do not pro-
vide the necessary information about the acceptance of a cer-
tain risk. Therefore, the acceptable risk racc has to be known.
In Fig. 2 it is assumed to be smaller than the perceived and
the objective risk. The differences dE1 (between racc and
robj) and dE2 (between robj and rperc) are caused by differ-
ent occurrence of the relevant factors. In the proposed ap-
proach, these factors with their speciﬁc occurrence are called
Perception Affecting Factors PAF and Evaluation Criteria
EC.
The conceptual approach is based on two “models”. On
the one hand a “risk model” aiming at modelling the risk,
and on the other hand a “person model” aiming at modelling
the evaluating person.
There are three relevant assumptions as a basis for the
“risk model”. Firstly, the perceived individual risk rperc does
not comply with the objective individual risk robj (see also
Fig. 2), i.e.
rperc 6= robj (8)
Secondly, it is assumed that, using a set of perception af-
fecting factors PAF as well as the objective individual risk
robj, the perceived individual risk rperc can be calculated ac-
cording to
rperc = f(PAF,robj) (9)
And thirtly, it is assumed that the acceptable individual
risk racc can be calculated, in accordance with the opinion of
Hollenstein (1997), using the evaluation criteria EC and the
perceived individual risk rperc
racc = f(EC,rperc) = f(EC,PAF,robj) (10)
The general conceptual model approach is deﬁned by the
way the above mentioned model parameters are combined.
It seems to be useful to choose a geometric approach with
an ampliﬁcation effect for e.g. the overal PAF when several
pafi change since the individual PAF components have a
multiplicative effect after
rperc = robj ∗((a1 ∗paf1 ∗a2 ∗paf2 ∗...∗an ∗pafn))(11)
where ai is the weight and pafi the value of the ith PAF
component. Thereby, the following relation holds
pafi = 1 ⇔ neutral value of pafi (12)
For the acceptable risk racc the same combination rules are
valid, so that it looks like
racc = rperc ∗ ((a1 ∗ ec1 ∗ a2 ∗ ec2 ∗ ... ∗ an ∗ ecn)) (13)
where ai is the weight and eci the value of the ith EC com-
ponent. Thereby, the following relation holds, too
eci = 1 ⇔ neutral value of eci (14)
The “person model”, ﬁnally, is used to create model evalu-
ators mei with the help of a Monte-Carlo-Simulation. These
model evaluators are supposed to be surrogates for the real
life individuals and will then be provided with an appropri-
ate weighting factor gmei.
The “risk model” and the “person model” will be com-
bined after
rperc,mei = robj · PAF · gmei (15)
for the perceived risk and in accordance with
racc,mei = rperc · EC · gmei (16)
for the acceptable risk. Consequently, the decision about the
acceptance Acc of a certain individual risk ri can now be
made in accordance with Eq. (17)
Acc =

1 if rperc,mei ≤ racc,mei
0 if rperc,mei > racc,mei
(17)
As the proposed risk evaluation approach aims at mod-
elling the evaluation of the collective risk R, this risk has to
be calculated. In its easiest deﬁnition, the collective risk is
deﬁned as the sum of all individual risks r of a community
according to
R =
n X
i=1
ri (18)
Therefore, it is possible to compute the perceived collec-
tive risk Rperc as well as the acceptable collective risk Racc
in accordance with Eq. (18), so that the acceptance Acc of a
certain collective risk can now be made after
Acc =

1 if Rperc ≤ Racc
0 if Rperc > Racc
(19)
If a certain collective risk Ri is acceptable (Acc=1), this
risk Racc,i can now be compared with the objective collec-
tive risk Robj,i within the risk management. This comparison
may provide three possible states, i.e.
Robj,i < Racc,i (20)Th. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards 361
Robj,i = Racc,i (21)
Robj,i > Racc,i (22)
The states of Eqs. (20) and (21) only require monitoring,
whereas the state characterized by the Eq. (22) means that
risk mitigating measures or measures increasing the accep-
tance of the risk have to be taken.
4 A proposition for the implementation of the current
knowledge about risk perception and evaluation
One of the major objectives of this study is to advance the
consideration of the current knowledge about risk perception
and evaluation of natural hazards in the approaches of risk
evaluation. Therefore, the use of perception affecting factors
PAF and evaluation criteria EC is suggested to compute the
perceivedindidvidualriskrperc andtheacceptableindividual
risk racc.
4.1 Perception Affecting Factors PAF and Evaluation Cri-
teria EC
The PAF are the relevant driving factors of natural hazard
risk perception on the individual level. The determination of
the PAF is based on a survey of literature about risk percep-
tion in all ﬁelds of risks but a main focus of natural hazards
(e.g Farmer, 1967; Starr, 1969; Slovic et al., 1986; Slovic,
1987; Fell, 1994; McDaniels et al., 1995, 1996; Finlay and
Fell, 1997; Renn, 1998, 2001; Renn and Klinke, 2002; Zwick
et al., 2002; Plapp, 2004)). Subsequently, a qualitative selec-
tion process aiming at the elimination of collinearity effects
among the factors was conducted. The resulting set of factors
was submitted to a group of experts from technological, ad-
ministrative and social institutions dealing with natural haz-
ards. These experts assessed the relevance of the individual
factors for the perception of natural hazard risks and these
results were then compiled. Consequently, a smaller list of
relevant factors affecting the perception of risk resulted and
was tested, again on a qualitative basis, a second time for
collinearity, such that redundant factors could be grouped
without signiﬁcant loss of information (see Table 1).
The PAF are used to calculate dE2 after
dE2 = f(PAF) (23)
and thus
rperc = robj − dE2 (24)
The inﬂuence of a single PAF on the perception of a risk
canbeillustratedwiththeexampleofthe“voluntariness”. As
the literature shows, there is more willingness to accept vol-
untary than involuntary risks and involuntary risks are per-
ceived to be higher than voluntary risks (e.g Starr, 1969).
Based on these facts, it can be assumed that a risk that is
taken voluntarily may be larger than the effective risk robj,
and, on the other hand, that an involuntarily taken risk should
be smaller than the effective risk (see Fig. 3). Thus, it can be
Table 1. List of relevant perception affecting factors PAF, incor-
porating a subjective measure of the components of the effective
risk robj. The factors in the column on the right are those known
from literature. Note: The suggested selection of factors is work in
progress and subject to change.
Perception Affecting Factor represents
Voluntariness: Voluntariness
Reducibility: Reducibility,
Predictability,
Avoidability
Knowledge: Familiarity,
Knowledge about risk,
Manageability
Endangerment: Controllability,
Number of people affected,
Fatality of consequences,
Distribution of victims
(spatio-temporal),
Scope of area affected,
Immediacy of effects,
Directness of impact
Subjective measure of:
Extent of damage: Extent of damage
Frequency of event: Frequency of event
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Fig. 3. The difference dE1 and dE2 between can, at least partly, be
explained by additional factors, as e.g. the voluntariness of a risk.
drawn the conclusion, that the acceptable level of an invol-
untary risk should be lower than the acceptable level of a
voluntary risk.
According to Hollenstein (1997) the evaluation of a risk is
based on the perception of the risk. The key question is, what
are the criteria to deﬁne the level of the acceptable risk, i.e.
what are the relevant Evaluation Criteria EC? These criteria
are important for the deﬁnition of the acceptable indivdual
risk racc.
As a working hypothesis, it is assumed that the in Table 1
mentionedfactorscanalsobeusedasEvaluationCriteriaEC
to calculate dE1 after
dE1 = f(EC) (25)362 Th. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards
Table2. ThePAF andEC andtheircomponentvaluesandweight-
ing values. Note: the weighting value w is the result of an expert
workshop at the ETH Z¨ urich on 23.11.2004.
PAF/EC Component Weighting
value value w
[0.5–2.0] [0.0–1.0]
Voluntariness v=[0.5–2.0] w(v)=0.375
Reducibility r=[0.5–2.0] w(r)=0.333
Knowledge ex=[0.5–2.0] w(ex)=0.875
Endangerment d=[0.5–2.0] w(d)=0.667
Measured
extent of consequences Cexp Cexp=[0.5–2.0] w(Cexp)=1
Measured frequency F F=[0.5–2.0] w(F)=1
and thus
racc = robj − dE1 (26)
Thus, a factor is not only relevant for the perception of a
risk, but also for the evaluation of a risk after
EC = f(PAF) (27)
and it can be assumed that the occurrence of a factor for the
evaluationofriskisdifferentfromtheoccurrenceofthe same
factor for the perception of risk. Additional Evaluation Cri-
teria EC according to
c ∈ EC ∧ c / ∈ PAF (28)
will only be deﬁned if it appears to be required for the model.
4.2 Quantiﬁcation of PAF and EC
The quantiﬁcation of the PAF and EC is an important step.
Several data sources are analysed with regard to quantitative
values for the PAF and the EC:
– risk perception literature: explanation reports about
risk perception studies (with a focus on studies accom-
plished in central Europe).
– data from a recently ﬁnished survey about the percep-
tion of natural hazards risks in Germany (Plapp, 2004).
– data from a survey about the perception and evaluation
of natural hazard risks in Switzerland (Siegrist et al.,
2004).
In accordance with the ﬁndings of risk perception and
evaluation research, it has to be stated that risk aversion is
more than a function of the extent of direct damage. For
example, the indirect effects of hazardous events (e.g. costs
of enacted laws, costs of psychological support of affected
people, cost of recovery actions, etc.) have also to be consid-
ered. Both indirect and direct effects can e.g. be included in
the term expected consequences Cexp.
The proposed model of natural hazard risk evaluation
works, therefore, with an enhanced deﬁnition of risk aver-
sion. In addition to the expected extent of damage E, more
aspects are included that are assumed to be important. These
are mainly the following items:
– Expected extent of consequences Cexp of an event.
– “Speciality” of an event (extraordinary event vs. normal
events): the speciality of an event can be measured us-
ing a surrogate, e.g. the frequency (or the probability of
occurrence) of the event.
– Perception Affecting Factors PAF: since the magni-
tude of the potential damage is relevant for the risk
evaluation, the scale for judging this magnitude is
also important. The reluctance of an event i may be
stronger than that of an event j even though the rela-
tions Robj,i<Robj,j and Cexp,i<Cexp,j may hold. This
can e.g. occur when i results from an involuntary and j
from a voluntary activity. The inﬂuence of the percep-
tion affecting factor ’Voluntariness’ results in the rela-
tion Rperc,i>Rperc,j.
Thus, within the propsed conceptual approach both the ex-
pected consequences Cexp and the frequency F (or probabil-
ity p) of an event have to be integrated within the PAF and
EC (see Table 2).
The relevant factors of risk perception and evaluation have
to be “transformed” into ﬁgures. When calculating a speciﬁc
risk, the PAF and EC receive a component value between
0.5 and 2.0 (that is equal to pafi after Eq. (11) and Eq. (12)
or eci after Eq. (13) and Eq. (14) and a speciﬁc weighting
value (that is equal to ai within the Eq. (11) and Eq. (13))
thatiscurrentlybasedonanexpertworkshopholdattheETH
Z¨ urich (see Table 2).
The extent of risk aversion can then be estimated e.g. us-
ing the values of the expected consequences Cexp (or, as an
approximation, the extent of the direct damage E), the fre-
quency F (or the probability of occurrence) of an event as
well as the weighting of the factors affecting the perception
(PAF) and the evaluation (EC) of a risk. Thus, the ﬁndings
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have to be taken into ac-
count. The Prospect Theory reveals that human risk percep-
tion is an asymmetric and non-linear process in which more
emphasis is put on the “losses” as a possible outcome of a
decision than on the possible “gains” (see Fig. 4).
Thevalue(utility)functionoftheProspectTheoryisbased
on the assumption that changes are the carriers of value and
these changes are made in relation to a reference point work-
ing as the zero point of the value scale
v(x) = 0 (29)
As shown in Fig. 4, the resulting value function is con-
cave for gains and convex for losses and is steepest at the
reference point itself. Furthermore, the value function for
losses is steeper than the value function for gains and the
marginal value for both gains and losses are decreasing. ButTh. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards 363
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Fig. 4. The asymmetric and non-linear value function of the
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) puts more empha-
sis on “losses” than on “gains”.
ﬁnally, the value function can also be convex for gains and
concave for losses since, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
write, the derived value function of an individual does not
always reﬂect “pure” attitudes to money, since it could be
affected by additional consequences associated with speciﬁc
amounts. Such perturbations can readily produce convex re-
gions in the value function for gains and concave regions in
the value function for losses. The latter case may be more
common since large losses often necessitate changes in life
style.
Using the ﬁndings of the Prospect Theory, a possible con-
cept for estimating the extent of risk aversion could be the
measure of the aversive and non-aversive impacts of PAF
and EC. Such a measure can be done e.g. using a proceed-
ing like the one drafted in Table 3. The component values
pafi and/or eci [0.5–2.0] describe the occurrence of a PAF
and/or a EC in a certain risk situation.
The super-proportional weighting of the “losses” complies
with the assumption of risk aversion used in the introduced
approach: an outcome that does not comply with the ob-
jectives and the idea of a “gain” of the relevant people, is
weighted as a “loss” and, thus, deﬁned as an negative out-
come. For example, according to the perception affecting
factors PAF, an involuntary activity causes risk aversion.
Thus, involuntariness has to be accounted for as a “loss” (due
to the fact that, according to the Prospect Theory, “losses”
causes risk reluctance). This means that the term “loss” is a
surrogate for involuntary, irreducible and dreadful risks and
those with a high extent of consequences Cexp and a high
frequency. The term “gain”, consequently, reﬂects opposite
aspects: it is a surrogate for voluntary, reducible and dread-
less risks with a small extent of consequences and a low fre-
quency.
Table 3. The terms “Loss” and “Gain” of the Prospect Theory are
used as surrogates for a speciﬁc set of the risk aversion charac-
teristics. They get the value of 2 (“Loss”), 1 (“Neutral”) and 0.5
(“Gain”) and work as pafi or eci within the Eqs. (11) to (14).
Component “Loss” “Neutral” “Gain”
PAF: Involuntary Neutral Voluntary
Reducible Neutral Irreducible
Experience with Neutral No experience with
Dreadful Neutral Without dread
Measure of large Measure of small
extent of Cexp Neutral extent of Cexp
Measure of high F Neutral Meassure of low F
Value: 2 1 0.5
Results in: Risk aversion Neutral No risk aversion
4.3 The representation of the evaluating person
The proposed risk evaluation approach aims at modelling the
evaluation of the collective risk Rcoll. In its easiest deﬁnition,
the collective risk can be deﬁned as the sum of all individual
risks rperc of a community according to Eq. (18).
The risk rperc perceived by an individual not only depends
on the above mentioned PAF factors and the effective risk
robj, butalsoonfactorsthathavenoimmediaterelationtothe
risk itself, but to the evaluating person. Among these factors
are for example:
– the person’s economic perspectives
– his or her social environment (structural and cultural
properties of the community)
– his or her values and world views
– his or her psychological and behavioral characteristics
(e.g. risk seeking vs. risk averse)
These individual factors should be accounted for in a
comprehensive approach of risk evaluation, even though the
model aims at the collective acceptable risk level Racc. How-
ever, considering these factors on a really individual basis is
almost impossible, since it would in principle require that
data about each and every person is gathered. Instead, a sur-
rogate “model evaluator” is introduced. For this purpose, a
broad classiﬁcation for each of the above mentioned individ-
ual evaluation factors is deﬁned (e.g., limited/average/good
economic perspectives, instable or poorly developed/stable
and well developed social environment, etc.). Subsequently,
thefrequencydistributionofthepopulationforallfactorsand
classes is estimated (e.g. relying on national statistic data) to-
gether with the qualitative effect that a certain class assign-
ment has on the perception. For example, limited economic
perspectives or a poorly developed social environment may
make all natural risks appear more (e.g., twice as) severe than
good economic perspectives or a well developed social envi-
ronment, since it is more difﬁcult for the individual to re-
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are determined, a Monte-Carlo simulation can be used to in-
vestigate and aggregate a large number of ’model evaluators’
(each one having an ’individual’ accepted risk rind) and thus
also the Racc can be computed and the acceptability judge-
ment according to Eq. (19) can be made. This is current work
in progress.
5 Discussion: The difﬁculties of the proposed approach
Developing a model requires decisions about the relevance of
several parameters affecting the modelled process. On one
hand, the more parameters are considered, the better does
the model correspond to reality, but the more demanding it
is to use this model. On the other hand, if fewer parame-
ters are used, then the application of the model is easier and
the results are generally more stable. However, this comes at
the cost of an increased probability of having omitted rele-
vant factors. The model building process is thus a trade-off
between the applicability and the representativeness of the
model.
From a risk management point of view, a model that al-
lows at least a rough, though still not completely accurate
estimation of the risk evaluation is better than having noth-
ing at all. In engineering terms, this means that the goal is a
simple and sound model rather than a sophisticated and com-
plicated one. Therefore, the emphasis is on a small number
of relevant factors affecting the risk evaluation, allowing for
a certain inaccuracy of the model results.
However, several critical points of the proposed model
must be remain. First, the idea to derive a normative for-
mulation from social and psychological factors originally de-
rived in a non-normative context and applying this formula-
tion within an engineering context may give raise to ques-
tions. However, managing risks involves making decisions,
and while it is obvious that a perfect representation of the
real risk evaluation will never be possible, one should never-
theless try to improve the basis for the decision making. The
goal is not to replace the evaluation process, but to facilitate
the selection of ’good’ options (i.e., those that are likely to
be in line with the evaluation) within the framework of risk
management.
A second issue is the deﬁnition of the PAF components
as suggested above (including their weights and scales). It is
obvious that lay persons play a vital role in evaluating risks.
They should be represented in the deﬁnition of the factors
that drive the model. This was not possible due to time and
budget constraints. This is a shortcoming of the chosen ap-
proach, but the author hopes that he will be able to (partly)
compensate it by using the results of recent and current in-
vestigations about the public perception of natural risks from
Switzerland and Germany for calibration and validation of
the model.
A third issue is the inclusion of risk aversion in the evalu-
ation process. While aversion was the only factor considered
so far in formal evaluation procedures, it may almost disap-
pear as a factor in the new model since it is expressed by
the characteristics of the model parameters. Risk aversion is,
compared to the current practice, used in a clearly different
way and also with a different intention. One might argue that
this should at least be reﬂected by using another terminol-
ogy. However, it is the opinion of the author that the use of
aversion is justiﬁed by the very meaning of the word. This
would be a clear change in practice, and it remains to be seen
if such a change will be endorsed by the risk management
community.
A fourth issue is the use of “model evaluators” for repre-
senting individuals (and on an aggregate level also communi-
ties). Social classiﬁcation has a tradition in psychology and
sociology, but it has probably not been operationally used
in a context similar to the present one. Currently, neither the
sensible choice of the ideas nor the legitimacy of the assump-
tion that they can be aggregated to represent communities is
clear. Additional work will be necessary to provide a more
solid foundation for the inclusion of perception factors that
are not related to the risk characteristics.
A ﬁnal issue for discussion is certainly the accuracy of the
model predictions that can be achieved and the beneﬁts that
can be derived
from these predictions. Both factors will be difﬁcult to es-
timate before the model can actually be applied to decision-
making situations. Even if the model application is easy (i.e.,
notrequiring alot of effort forunderstandingor data procure-
ment), it is still an additional step in the decision procedure
with an initially unproven return. Thus, the beneﬁts that im-
proved information about risk evaluation provides in the risk
management process must be actively communicated at least
until the usage of the model is established in the risk man-
agement community.
6 Conclusions
A new culture of dealing with natural hazards requires a risk-
based approach. But why is it necessary to introduce a new
risk culture? What are the driving factors of this develop-
ment?
In recent years, there is an increasing societal claim for
security and a decreasing level of risk acceptance. Further-
more, there are increasing marginal costs of risk protective
measures, but decreasing ﬁnancial resources for the man-
agement of natural hazards. This results in an optimization
problem and raises the questions “How can the ﬁnancial re-
sources be used most efﬁciently?” and “How can the most
effective risk mitigation measures be achieved?”. Since ﬁ-
nancial resources are becoming more and more restricted, the
allocation of the money is regarded critically by the public.
Therefore, the competent authorities, working on behalf of
the society, have to consider not only the scientiﬁc ﬁndings
and methods for computing the risk, but must also include
the public concerns.
One of the key problems is the lack of information about
what the societal risk acceptance ex-ante (i.e., before an
event). Afteranevent, thesocietyoftensimplyrequiresthataTh. Plattner: Modelling public risk evaluation of natural hazards 365
similar event may never happen again. There are many cases
of catastrophic events, mainly in the ﬁeld of technological
hazards, that resulted in societal risk acceptance levels. An
example is the ﬁre in a chemical storage facility in Schweiz-
erhalle in 1986 that led to the development of the Swiss Ordi-
nance on Technological Hazards (St¨ orfallverordnung) (EDI,
1989) that now regulates the handling of technological risks
in Switzerland and considers the acceptable level of risk (us-
ing the approach of Boundary Line). However, examples of
a proactive deﬁnition of a societal safety level are rare. In
the ﬁeld of natural hazards, the society never deﬁned what
levels of risk are acceptable. Thus, the competent authorities
suffer from a lack of decision criteria, although the protec-
tion of the public is one of their major tasks. Consequently,
there exists a need for the authorities to know what the so-
ciety thinks about risks and what level of risk the society is
willing to accept. A formalized model that allows the simu-
lation of the public risk evaluation could be a useful tool to
support effective and efﬁcient risk mitigation measures.
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